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WTO: Time's Up for Chinese Banks-China's Banking
Reform and Non-Performing Loan Disposal
Weitseng Chen*t
This year's hottest topic in global capital markets will probably be the
overseas listings of China's "big four" state-owned commercial banks.'
International investment banks and a considerable number of prestigious
international law firms are currently joining forces to shape another golden
image of China's economic ascent. Equally striking is the less dazzling side to
this tale-that the overseas listings will keep China's banks from collapsing after
December 11, 2006, when China, in order to abide by its pledges in the World
Trade Organization ("WTO") accession agreement, will have to open its
banking market to foreign competition.
China's state banking system has been struggling with a staggering amount
of bad loans, which are estimated at around 40 percent of total outstanding
loans.2 In theory, if foreign banks will be conducting local currency business in
China, the massive deposit base that has been supporting China's de facto
bankrupt banking system will shift elsewhere.3 In order to prepare its banks for
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this tough challenge, China has been pushing these banks to seek overseas
listings.4
This Article will briefly examine several issues underlying the hottest
financial news in this year's global market. In particular, the Article will ask how
such large non-performing loans ("NPLs") have come to exist in the Chinese
banking system, how the Chinese economy has managed to grow despite its
many flawed and vulnerable banks, and how the Chinese have resolved the NPL
problem. Finally, the Article will discuss how effectively the NPL disposal
scheme has worked thus far, in the period before the upcoming overseas listings.
I. INTRODUCTION
Why was China able to survive the Asian financial crisis that began in
1997? A high-ranking Chinese official has given a concise but clear answer: how
could we lose this game if we did not even attend it?' However, the Chinese
government was shocked by the pervasive banking failures that occurred in
neighboring countries, including Thailand, South Korea, Indonesia, and
Malaysia. The reason for China's concern was understandable: the Chinese
banking system's ratio of bad loans to total outstanding loans was even higher
than that of the aforementioned Asian countries prior to the 1997 financial
crisis. 6 Surprisingly, estimates revealed in 2005 indicate that this is probably still
the case.'
Pinpointing the actual amount of China's NPLs is a task that has stymied
many top economists and investment analysts. According to the Chinese
government, the official number was approximately $240 billion in the middle of
2003,8 a total representing less than half of the number estimated by
international organizations and economists. The real figure, as estimated by

4

5

6

Banking System in China. Issues and Experience, 7 BIS Policy Papers 17, 30-31 (Bank for Intl
Settlements 1999).
James Miles, Hu, Wen, How?, in The World in 2006 (Special Issue) 44, 44-45 (Economist 2005);
Nicholas R. Lardy, IntegratingChina into the GlobalEconomy 128-33 (Brookings 2002).
Gong Yi and Kai Guo, The Rationale of ChinasBanking Reform, in Xinqiao Ping, Mn Song, and JunXi Zhang, eds, Coroorate Governance, Securiy Market, and Banking Reform 268-69 (Peking 2003).
The pre-crisis proportions of NPLs in these countries were: Thailand, 15 percent; South Korea,
16 percent; Indonesia, 12 percent; and Malaysia, 6.4 percent. Indeed, China's proportion of NPLs
is similar to or exceeds that of these countries in the post-crisis period (for instance, Thailand, 27
percent; Indonesia, 33 percent; and South Korea, 25 percent). Justin Yi-fu Lin and Tzu-bing Lee,
State-Owned Enterprisesand FinancialInstitutions Reform in China 23-42 (Peking 2003), available online
at <http://jlin.ccer.edu.cn/article/article.asp?id=246> (visited Apr 22, 2006); Yiping Huang,
China'sLast Steps Across the River 112-13 (Asia Pacific 2001).
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Martin Wolf, Why is China Growing So Slowly?: For All Its Success, China is Still Not Living Up to Its
Potential,146 Foreign Poly 50, 50-51 (2005).
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recent studies, ranges widely from $410 to $815 billion due to the lack of
complete, reliable official statistics. 9 Studies also show that NPLs have been
increasing at the rate of $150 billion per year since 2000.10
Furthermore, the high concentration of financial assets in China's economy
fosters a lack of diversification and competition, thereby increasing financial
risks. Without a modern capital market, most Chinese households save their
money in banks. The savings rate in China is around 40 percent, the world's
highest. Eighty-five percent of total household financial assets were in the form
of bank deposits in the 1990s, accounting for at least 70 percent of total
domestic savings as of 1997.11
If the huge amount of NPLs eventually causes a financial meltdown, it will
also undoubtedly trigger a political crisis in China.1 2 China's state banking system
has amassed 70 percent of total household savings and provided around a
million job opportunities. 3 Meanwhile, the weak financial market has resulted in
bank loans accounting for more than 80 percent of total corporate financing,
with state-owned enterprises ("SOEs") supplying nearly 80 percent of these
loans. 1 4 SOEs essentially borrow money from people through state banks to
maintain their inefficient businesses while thrifty Chinese people live by working

9

10

The quoted amount of bad loans includes both bad loans removed from the banks' balance sheets
to the Asset Management Companies ("AMCs") and bad loans that remain in the Chinese
banking system. Due to the Chinese bureaucracy's lack of transparency, the amounts estimated by
different researchers are not identical. However, even the most conservative estimate is much
higher than the official number. See, for example, Roubini and Setser, China Trip Report at 10-11
(cited in note 3); Wolf, 146 Foreign Poly at 51 (cited in note 7); Pieter Bottelier, Implications of
WITO Membership for China's State-Owned Banks and the Management of Public Finances: Issues and
Strategies, 11 J Contemp China 397, 401-02 (2002); Yiping Huang, Is Meltdown of the Chinese Banks
Inevitable? 13 China Econ Rev 382, 382-83 (2002); Guonan Ma and Ben S.C. Fung, China's Asset
Management Coporations, 115 BIS Working Paper 1-2 (Bank for Intl Settlements 2002), available
online at <http://www.bis.org/publ/workll5.htm> (visited Apr 22, 2006); Nicholas R. Lardy,
China's Unfinished Economic Revolution 115--24 (Brookings 1998).
Mu Feng, Bank of China Plans to Sell Non-Pe forming Loans, Epoch Times aJuly 11, 2004), available
online at <http://english.epochtimes.com/news/4-7-11/22365.html>
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Huang, China'sLast Steps at 100-01 (cited in note 6).
A Taiwanese entrepreneur has relayed an astonishing story about the fragility of the Chinese
banking system. His business was based in a city with an energetic new mayor who swore to shut
down the prostitution industry. However, the mayor's policy was terminated merely one week
after taking effect because the city's banks did not have enough cash for those prostitutes who
wanted to move out and withdraw their deposits. The anti-prostitute policy unexpectedly
triggered a run on banks and a liquidity crisis. Interview with J.R. Chen, CEO of a technology
company, in Taipei, Taiwan (May 30, 2003).
For example, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China had 541,525 employees in 1999.
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12

Summer 2006

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

for SOEs. During the past two decades, this model, by which the government
could efficiently collect capital from ordinary people for injection into various
strategic industries, has contributed to China's continuing economic growth. It is
also one of the means through which the Chinese Communist Party has secured
its legitimacy. The model will invariably be destroyed if its key mechanism, the
state banking system, collapses.
II. CHINA'S ECONOMIC TRANSITION AND THE
CAUSES OF BAD LOANS
The causes of China's NPLs can be clarified only in the context of China's
economic development strategy. Prior to the start of banking reform in the
1990s, China's banks maintained close connections with state-owned enterprises,
including both large SOEs and their smaller local counterparts, town and village
enterprises ("TVEs").5 Because SOEs play a crucial role in linking Chinese
banks to the market and generating employment opportunities, state banks are
cash cows for SOEs. Indeed, SOEs and TVEs received almost all of the credits
allocated by state banks in the period preceding the banking reform movement,
and they continue to dominate in this respect, despite producing only one-third
of the country's industrial output. Studies examining the period from 1993 to
2000 show that more than 60 percent of bank loans were earmarked for SOEs. 6
In short, the banks are one integral part of the governmental mechanism for
allocating community capital, which is merely viewed as a component of the
government's budget. 7
As a consequence, SOEs and TVEs, the Chinese banks' two major clients,
are responsible for a considerable amount of NPLs held by the banks. 8 During
the first fifty years after the establishment of the People's Republic of China,
SOEs and TVEs played distinct, strategic roles in the nation's development.
SOEs were responsible for developing technology and products that allowed
China to become independent of the international market during the Cold War

15
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For a general discussion, see Jean C. Oi and Andrew Walder, eds, Propery Rights and Economic
Reform in China (Stanford 1999); Jean C. Oi, Rural China Takes Off Institutional Foundations of
Economic Reform (Berkeley 1999).
Huang, China'sLast Steps at 100-18 (cited in note 6).
See William A. Byrd, Enrepreneurship,Capital,and Ownersho, in William A. Byrd and Qingsong Lin,
eds, China's RuralIndustly: Structure, Development, and Reform 199-205, 214-15 (Oxford 1990).
See Mariko Watanabe, ed, China's Non-Peforming Loan Problem 27-38 (Institute of Developing
Economies 2000); Robert A. Mundell, Monetay and FinancialMarket Reform in TransitionEconomies:
The Special Case of China, in Mario I. Blejer and Marko Skreb, eds, FinancialSector Transformation:
Lessonsfrom Economies in Transition265, 267-69 (Cambridge 1999).
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era while the less controlled TVEs experimented with capitalism at the local
level.
The quantity of NPLs increased markedly when SOEs failed to carry out
strategic missions that far exceeded their capacity. By implementing these costly
policies, the SOEs would have collapsed without the banks' fiscal support. To
maintain such financially precarious SOEs, the Chinese government was forced
to allocate credits in state banks to the SOEs, attaching loose conditions to the
extension of credit. According to a survey conducted in 1999, loans to SOEs
have accounted for about 75 percent of all bank loans.' 9 To buttress the SOEs,
the government has implemented a so-called "unified system of deposits and
loans" that collects and centralizes all private sector credits and savings by
restricting the incorporation of new banks.2 0 These constraints have led to an
uncompetitive and inefficient financial market that hides NPLs.
Local TVEs, which have fewer policy burdens than SOEs, have received
correspondingly less credits from the government. Because of their limited
formal access to state banks, TVEs have either approached banks informally or
established their own underground banking networks. 2 Insufficient monitoring
mechanisms and flawed accounting systems in state banks have enabled local
officials and party cadres, who also have positions in TVEs, to readily access
credit by informal means, such as guanxi (connections) and bribery.22
Furthermore, the Chinese Communist Party has adopted a performanceoriented evaluation system that promotes local cadres on the sole basis of their
economic achievement for state-owned enterprises and local governments. This
evaluation mechanism, which ties performance to the amount of capital
accumulated, provides further incentives for local officials and cadres to bribe
bank staff members to access credits. Such behavior jeopardizes the banking
system and results in increased NPLs.

19

John Barrel and Yiping Huang, Dealing with the Bad Loans of the Chinese Banks, Discussion Paper

20

Series No 13, 10 (APEC Study Center/Columbia 2000), available online at <http://
www.columbia.edu/cu/business/apec/publications/boninhuang.pdf> (visited Apr 22, 2006).
Huang, China'sLast Steps at 48 (cited in note 6).
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See, for example, Peter S. Goodman, FinancialEnterpcise in China at Odds with Party Politics, Wash
Post A01 (Jan 2, 2004). For a general discussion, see Kellee S. Tsai, Back-Alley Banking: Private
Entrepreneursin China (Cornell 2002).
See Chih-jou Jay Chen, Local Institutions and the Transformationof Property Rights in Southern Fujian, in
Jean C. Oi and Andrew Walder, eds, Property Rights and Economic Reform in China 49, 51-69
(Stanford 1999); Tsai, Back-Alley Banking at 35-59 (cited in note 21).

Summer 2006

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

III. THREE PHASES IN CHINA'S BANKING REFORM
AND BAD LOAN DISPOSAL
The dynamics
Interestingly, while
the banking reform
China's successful
system.

of China's banking reform can be divided into three phases.
China initiated economic reform in 1979, it did not launch
movement until the mid-1990s. Indeed, for at least a decade,
economic reform was not based on an efficient banking

A. WHY A LATE BANKING REFORM?
Three hypotheses help to explain why Chinese banking reform began more
than a decade after the country's economic reform. First, China did not have a
banking system that needed reformation because the Chinese government
viewed its banks as branches of the Ministry of Finance rather than as a
contemporary banking system. While Chinese banks operate as mechanisms
used by authorities to manipulate the private sector and to allocate credits to
SOEs, they also resemble tax agencies in that they take savings from thrifty
people, which thereafter sustain the state apparatus, at a minimal cost to
themselves. These people, who rarely withdraw their money, believe that saving
is a traditional moral virtue and doubt that Chinese banks will suffer a
meltdown. Without liquidity pressure, Chinese banks are not run like typical
banks.
Second, China did not demand a modern banking system whose
characteristic autonomy may have reduced the flexibility needed by authorities to
conduct other economic reforms. For instance, since 1979, the Chinese banking
system has been both a tool to support economic growth and an instrument to
facilitate other reforms, such as those of SOEs. Asset Management Companies
("AMCs"), which are major institutions that were established in 2000 to dispose
of China's NPLs, have similar multiple functions.
Third, China did not have the capacity, political or economic, to reform its
banking system amidst a highly decentralized transition process. Its central bank
serves as a notable example of this hypothesis. In September 1983, the State
Council of the People's Republic of China ("State Council") decided in principle
to have People's Bank of China ("People's Bank") function as the central bank.23
However, the State Council waited until 1986 to promulgate the "People's
Republic of China Provisional Regulations Related to Bank Management" that

23

Histoy of The Peopk's Bank of China, available online at <http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/
renhangjianjie/history.asp> (visited Apr 22, 2006).
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gave People's Bank the legal basis to operate as China's de facto central bank.24
However, the central government failed to enforce this ordinance, which
required placing the state banks' local branches under the supervision of
People's Bank.25 Powerful local governments vetoed the personnel policy of
People's Bank's local branches, fearing that this policy might endanger the
substantial funds that the local governments had set aside for various regional
businesses, including some illegitimate ones.26 It was not until
1993 that People's
2
Bank was able to enforce its financial supervision authority.
Since 1979, China's decentralization policy has been regarded as a major
incentive for local governments to achieve economic growth. This policy, a
quick fix to China's pressing problems after the Cultural Revolution (19661976), aims to relieve the central government's financial burdens by delegating
the decision-making power over economic policies to local governments in
return for tax revenues. 28 However, local governments that have captured
institutions to achieve their short term economic goals have fewer incentives to
promote institutional reforms.29
B. BEFORE 1993: BANKING REFORM AS PART OF STATEOWNED ENTERPRISE REFORM
Banking reform measures, including the push to dispose of NPLs, were
triggered by two major financial crises in the 1990s. The first was the domestic
inflation crisis from 1993 to 1994 and the second was the Asian financial crisis in
1997.
24

25

People's Republic of China Provisional Regulations Related to Bank Management, arts 3-11
(1986), available online at <http://fol.math.sdu.edu.cn/jrfy/content/content.php?id=163&tb=
jrfg> (visited Apr 22, 2006). See also Lardy, China's Unfinished Economic Revolution at 173-74 (cited
in note 9).
See Richard W.S. Wu, Impementation of InternationalStandards: Some Observationsfrom China, in Say

26

Goo, Douglas Arner, and Zhongfei Zhou, eds, InternationalFinancialSector Reform: StandardSetting
and InfrastructureDevelopment 271, 273-74 (Kluwer 2002).
Jinglian Wu, Economic Reform in Conteporay China 212-13 (Shanghai Far East 2004); Lardy, China's

27

28

29

Unfinished Economic Revolution at 173 (cited in note 9).
See Lardy, China's UnfinishedEconomic Revolution at 174-75 (cited in note 9); Justin Y.F. Lin, China's
FinancialSystem Reform: A HistoricalReview and Its Future 9-10 (Peking 2000) available online at
<http://old.ccer.edu.cn/workingpaper/paper/c2000005.pdf> (Chinese) (visited Apr 22, 2006).
For a general discussion, see Kai-yuen Tsui and Youqiang Wang, Between Separate Stoves and a Single
Menu: Fiscal Decentralization in China, 177 China Q 71 (2004); Gabriella Montinola, Yingyi Qian,
and Barry Weingast, Federalism,Chinese Syle: The PoliticalBasisfor Economic Success in China, 48 World
Pol 50 (1995); Andrew Walder, Local Governments as Industrial Firms:An OiganiZationalAnalysis of
China'sTransitionalEconomy, 101 AmJ Sociology 263 (1995).
Qingsong Lin, Private Enterprises: Their Emergence, Rapid Growth, and Problems at 172-88 (cited in note

17).
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Prior to the 1993 inflation crisis, China's banking reform played only a
supplemental role in SOB reform. For instance, the Chinese government
stopped subsidizing SOEs through the banking system in 1986 and began to
require that they borrow money from banks. 30 Nevertheless, these measures
were intended to enhance the SOEs' incentive to use capital more efficiently by
raising capital costs; they did not endeavor to relieve the banks' policy burdens.3'
Because banks were still essentially governmental agencies supporting the SOEs,
they were not allowed to reject loan applications. In addition, they lacked the
bargaining power to require enterprises to repay loans. SOEs dominated the
planned economy, and officials and party cadres retained a deep involvement in
the SOE loaning process.32
In this regard, the court system has played an insignificant role in loan
disputes between banks and SOEs. Studies show that Chinese courts have only
administrative and record-production functions in cases involving competing
loan claims between banks and SOEs.33 They follow orders from the SOEs and
banks, which both intend to manipulate their balance sheets and internal
accounts by collecting judicial documents. For example, banks may write off bad
loans and stop providing loss reserves if they obtain a court order announcing
the financial inabilities of defaulting SOB borrowers. Meanwhile, SOB
borrowers will exist and operate without repaying their loans. 4 This state of
affairs has persisted in recent years even as AMCs have become very active in
bringing lawsuits against defaulting borrowers.3 5
C. AFTER THE 1993 INFLATION CRISIS: BAD LOAN
DISPOSAL INITIATIVES
1. The 1993 Inflation Crisis and Banking Reform
China's 1993-1994 inflation crisis resulted from an expansionary monetary
policy that sought to achieve rapid growth by bidding down interest rates to
30

Wu, Economic Reform at 208-09 (cited in note 26).

31

See Edward S. Steinfeld, Foqing Reform in China: The Fate of State-Owned Industry 68-70 (Cambridge
1998).
See Yasheng Huang, Selling China:ForeignDirect Investment during the Reform Era 117-21 (Cambridge

32

2003); Justin Yi-fu Lin, The Chinese Miracle: Development Strategy and Economic Reform 218-19
(Shanghai Renmin 2d ed 2002); Ting Gong, Forms and Characteristicsof China's Corruption in the
1990s: Change with Continuiy, 30 Communist and Post-Communist Studies 277, 282-83 (1997).
33

34

Yingmao Tang, Social Transition, Evolving State-Owned Enterpises and JudicialInstitutions in China:A
Theory of Legal Institutions in China 201-04 (2003) (unpublished JSD dissertation, Yale Law School)
(on file with the Yale University Library).
Id at 75-86.

35

Id at 58-62.
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stimulate spending and, in turn, raise output and inflation.36 When Chinese
banks were required to maintain low interest rates, they became unprofitable
since the real interest rate at the time was actually negative and loans were rarely
fully repaid.37 High inflation, further lowering the real interest rate, worsened the
banks' financial status.
This crisis underscored the fragility of China's financial system, which
lacked mechanisms to monitor and stabilize the increasing inflation rate.38 Since
then, the Chinese government has been determined to transform the state banks
from mere cashiers for the state sector into a modern banking system. The
movement to rectify the NPL problem has also gained serious momentum.
2. Legal Initiatives for Banking Reform
Chinese banking authorities initially focused on restructuring the banking
system since this was the easiest, most familiar method for China to conduct
reform. The method did not require making more difficult decisions involving
fundamental policy or personnel changes.
In 1995, National People's Congress passed the Law of the People's
Republic of China on the People's Bank of China to confirm People's Bank as
the nation's central bank.39 It was the first financial law since the founding of the
People's Republic and it assigned People's Bank, the only well-established
financial institution at the time, broad monetary authority. 4° The Law of the
People's Republic of China on Commercial Banks ("Commercial Bank Law")
was promulgated at the same time. Pursuant to this law, four major state
banks-Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Agricultural
Bank of China, and China Construction Bank-were transformed from
specialized banks to commercial banks.4'
The Commercial Bank Law was a significant milestone demonstrating that
the Chinese government sought to resolve the NPL crisis through institutional
reforms. Since the banks' inefficient investments had been a fundamental cause
of NPLs, the government adopted the US banking model established by the
36

Wu, Economic Reform at 212-13 (cited in note 26).

37

See Lardy, China's UnfinishedEconomic Revoluhion at 126-27 (cited in note 9).
Charles Wolf, Jr., et al, eds, FaultLines in China'sEconomic Terrain 121-23 (RAND 2003).

38
39
40
41

Law of the People's Republic of China on the People's Bank of China, arts 1, 2 (1995), available
online at <http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english//detail.asp?col=6800&ID=5> (visited Apr 22, 2006).
Wenkai Yang, Significance of China'sNew Monetary Law, in Manuel Guitian and Robert Mundell, eds,
Inflation and Growth in China 284, 284-86 (IMF 1996).
Law of the People's Republic of China on Commercial Banks, arts 14, 16, 17, 20, 21, 23, 39, 91
(1995), available online at <http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english//detail.asp?col=6800&ID=3>
(visited Apr 22, 2006) (hereinafter Commercial Bank Law); Wu, Economic Reform at 215 (cited in
note 26).
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Glass-Steagall Act,42 which restricted commercial banks' involvement in
investment business.43 The Chinese government also centralized power over
credit allocation by prohibiting local branches of 44state banks from loaning
money without obtaining consent from headquarters.
However, the NPL crisis continued and in fact escalated after SOEs
demanded more loans to survive in China's increasingly open and competitive
market. In China, whenever a major state firm has been threatened with financial
collapse, central authorities have traditionally provided bailout subsidies in the
form of "policy loans" from commercial banks. As long as SOEs remain
inefficient and unprofitable, state banks are required to sustain them. Meanwhile,
existing regulations and governance reforms are ignored and bypassed.
Because the banks have no chance of becoming profitable, banking
officials experience distorted incentives. Even though the Commercial Bank Law
authorizes them to make their own lending decisions,4 5 bank officials are never
actually held accountable for bad loans, which mainly result from policy loans.
After making the policy loans directed from above, bank officials have nothing
to lose by simply loaning the remainder of their available capital to the highest
bidder in rent-seeking games, regardless of the bidder's creditworthiness.46
Pervasive corruption thus reigns and bank officials can easily cover illegal
payoffs under the guise of bad loans. The uncompetitive nature of the banking
market has further decreased the incentive for banks to conquer inefficiency and
capital misallocation. While private enterprises and TVEs are becoming more
prominent and eagerly seeking capital, they have either approached illegal banks
or obtained loans through bribes and guanxi.47 Rent-seeking behaviors have been
penetrating the weak risk evaluation and supervision mechanisms and the NPL
problem has, in turn, become more pressing.

42

Banking Act of 1933, Pub L No 73-66, 48 Stat 162 (1933), (codified in scattered sections of 12
USC (2000), 15 USC § 19 (2000)). For a general discussion, see Charles W. Calomiris, U.S. Bank
Deregulation in HistoricalPerpective 334-49 (Cambridge 2000); Randall S. Kroszner and Raghuram
G. Rajan, Is the Glass-SteagallAct Justified? A Study of the U.S. Experience with UniversalBanking before
1933, 84 Am Econ Rev 810 (1994); George G. Kaufman and Larry R. Mote, Glass-Steagall:Repeal
by Regulatory and JudicialReinterretation, 107 Banking L J 388 (1990).

43

Wu, Economic Reform at 220-21 (cited in note 26).

44

Id at 215. See also Lin and Lee, State-Owned Enteprises at 28 (cited in note 6); Lin, China'sFinancial
System Reform at 9 (cited in note 27).

45

Commercial Bank Law, arts 3,4 (1995).
See Steinfeld, FogingReform at 68-73 (cited in note 31).

46

47

See Lin, China's FinancialSystem Reform at 20 (cited in note 27); Gong, Forms and Characteristicsof
China's Correption in the 1990s at 282-83 (cited in note 32); Andrew Wedeman, State Predation and
Rapid Growth: Politidzation of Business in China, in Edmund Terence Gomez, ed, PoliticalBusiness in
EastAsia 155, 164-68 (Roudedge 2002).
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The booming Chinese real estate market since the early 1990s is another
major factor that has counterbalanced the effect of NPL reform.4" In 1990, the
Chinese government liberalized state-owned land and allowed individuals renting
the land to develop it.49 Countless speculative land developers-local officials,
party cadres, and their relatives-rushed to borrow money from state banks for
leveraging their investment in this capital-oriented land market, ° leading to a
flood of NPLs.
While loans to SOEs account for 75 percent of all bank loans, the average
proportion of NPLs in SOEs increased from 25 percent in 1991 to 31 percent in
1995.51 In fact, most of the bad loans existed in the four major state-owned
commercial banks, which had recently been restructured under the framework
of the 1995 Commercial Bank Law. 2
Although its piecemeal banking reforms failed to alleviate the bad loan
crisis, the Chinese government refused to take further steps to restructure either
the state banking system or the monopolized banking market. By contrast, the
experiences of Eastern European countries, such as Poland and Hungary,
suggest that competition from foreign banks provides the most effective
stimulus for the transformation of domestic banking systems in transitional
economies.5 3
Why did China remain reluctant to open its market to foreign banks? It is
not hard to understand the rationale behind the Chinese government's hesitance.
First, if banking reform occurs before successful SOE reform, it must be gradual
and conservative. Otherwise it might endanger SOEs and trigger financial and
political crises. Second, unless banking reform succeeds, it is in China's interest
that the banking market remains a monopoly. Otherwise, foreign banks will
dominate the Chinese capital market, grasp a significant share of domestic

48

Chinese bank senior staff members use the term "golden age" to describe the widespread
corruption of officials and land developers in the early 1990s. Interview with anonymous Chinese
AMC employee (May 2, 2005) (hereinafter AMC Employee Interview). See also Lardy, China's
Unfinished Economic Revolution at 172-76 (cited in note 9); Lin, China's FinancialSystem Reform at 9-10
(cited in note 27).

49

Provisional Regulations of the People's Republic of China regarding the Grant and Assignment of
State-owned Land-use Rights in Urban Area (1990), arts 8, 19, 48. This ordinance is available in
English in Isabelle I.H. Wan, et al, A Professional's Guide to PRC Land Legislation 2097-2107 (Sweet
& Maxwell Asia 1999).
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savings, and then fail to support inefficient SOEs after applying international
loan standards.54
D. AFTER THE 1997 ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS: AMCs AND
BANK RECAPITALIZATION
1. A Mixed Approach to NPL Disposal
The 1997 Asian financial crisis has prompted the Chinese government to
finally take decisive measures to cope with NPLs. The fundamental challenge is
how to soften the bad loan problems generated by SOEs before taking major
strides toward SOE reform. SOE reforms are unlikely to succeed in the short
term since the nature of SOE reform resembles that of a complicated social
welfare reform program. While SOEs maintain urban employment, they also
provide social services, including social insurance, welfare, pensions, medical
care, housing, and education.55 Thus, it is implausible that state banks can obtain
swift relief from the policy burdens of supporting SOEs that have been
generating NPLs.
Ultimately, banking authorities must make state banks learn how to run as
commercial banks-namely by establishing the necessary conditions for this
initial reform. To do this, authorities must strengthen the financial capacity of
state banks, both as an incentive for banks to implement effective riskmanagement measures and for the benefit of international investors, who can
then participate in the banks' potential schemes for overseas listings. The most
efficient way to attain these goals is to write off bad loans by recapitalizing state
banks.
However, one confronts a paradox when considering the extent to which
state banks should be recapitalized. If the government injects too much capital
into the banks, it will reduce the incentive for banks to undertake further bad
loan disposal. If the amount is too small, the government will create the
expectation that additional recapitalization funds will be available perpetually.
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The pitfall of governmental recapitalization itself will foster the expectation that,
having bailed out the troubled banks once, the government will do so again. 6
The Chinese government finally selected a strategy representing a hybrid of
financial recapitalization and institutional reform. The central government began
by committing substantial funds to finance bad loan write-offs for state banks
and SOEs. 7 With respect to institutional reform, the government undertook two
initiatives. First, banking authorities conferred more autonomy upon commercial
banks. For instance, controls over credit quotas were abolished. The central
bank, People's Bank of China, also established its headquarters, replacing the
local branches in order to reduce interference from local officials.5 8 Second, in
2000, banking authorities started to employ a progressive institutional
initiative-asset management companies-as a foundational method to curb
NPLs.
2. Asset Management Companies
AMCs are modeled after the US Resolution Trust Company ("RTC')."9
They are firms that invest pooled funds from retail investors in securities or
equities, and their returns mainly derive from NPL disposal, such as through
sales of discounted bad assets purchased from Chinese bank creditors. One way
AMCs can package these assets is by securitizing mortgaged real estate, which
will then be sold in a secondary market at a higher price. However, Chinese
AMCs have a unique feature-the retail investors are the banks themselves. This
in turn means that AMCs are not subject to market forces, and the parent banks
set the amount and price of NPLs purchased by AMCs.
Four AMCs have been established by the four pillar state-owned
commercial banks, and these AMCs, which deal with the four parent banks' pre1996 NPLs, are designed to operate for ten years.60 Parent banks can select and
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then transfer NPLs predating 1996 to their respective AMCs. 61 Banks are
supposed to dispose of NPLs dating from 1996 onward by themselves since the
government has restructured the banking system and financed banks to write off
their NPLs as of 1996.
AMCs have been viewed not only as the main strategy for the disposal of
bad loans, but also as a solution that takes into account the close ties between
state banks and SOEs. The remainder of this Article will explore the rationale
behind the AMC strategy, the effectiveness of AMCs, and recent challenges to
the use of AMCs.

IV. AMCs: TURNING RISK INTO OPPORTUNITY?
A. INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL DISPOSAL?
The first question that Chinese banking authorities need to consider is
whether NPLs should be disposed of within or outside the banks. While
disposal within the banks represents the regular institutional arrangement, the
outside model represented by AMCs entails that the banks sell NPLs to an
external entity (here, an AMC) at a discounted rate in order to redeem cash to
write them off. AMCs that buy discounted NPLs subsequently package and sell
them to make returns.
Banks should generally be in a better position to resolve NPLs as
compared to centralized AMCs. AMCs may have to cope with information
asymmetry while banks have loan files and long-term relationships with their
borrowers. Leaving the problematic assets on banks' balance sheets has
additional advantages-encouraging banks to review and improve their flawed
loan procedures by providing incentives to both maximize the recovery value of
bad debts and avoid future losses.6"

61

note 9); Bin Zhang, Moral Hazardfrom AMCs Debt-for-Equity Swap and the Resolutions, 14 E China
Econ Management 44, 44 (2000).
In 1998, China's banking authority adopted the international standard loan classification, which

62

consists of five categories: normal, special mention, substandard, doubtful, and loss
(unrecoverable). Loans selected to be transferred to AMCs must be classified in the "doubtful"
category and must satisfy various technical requirements, such as adequate documentation.
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B. STRATEGY CHOSEN: THE AMC MODEL
In spite of the above-mentioned disadvantages, Chinese banking
authorities have chosen to dispose of NPLs through AMCs outside of the four
commercial banks. A legal reason underpinning their decision is the Commercial
Bank Law provision barring commercial banks from engaging in investment
banking activities.63 If authorities had entrusted banks, and not AMCs, with the
responsibility to carry out the debt-for-equity plan, the Commercial Bank Law
would have proscribed the arrangement.64 By swapping the debts of a troubled
SOE for equities, an AMC can become a new shareholder with representation
on the SOE's board of directors, which helps structure a viable SOE.
Meanwhile, the bad debts of that SOE can be written off.
This legal issue seems relatively minor because the NPL disposal scheme in
China, where the legal system lacks autonomy, is not decided by statutes but by
economic policies. The following reason thus appears more convincing: by
selling debts to AMCs in exchange for AMCs' outstanding shares, banks can
write off their bad loans immediately. This approach exchanges banks' bad
assets (NPLs) for good assets (AMC bonds) and hence attracts foreign investors
willing to help recapitalize the banking system by investing in the pillar banks.
It is important to underscore another major reason behind the
establishment of AMCs: assistance in the restructuring of SOEs. After becoming
the SOEs' biggest creditors, AMCs have started to convert their credit to
outstanding shares in these troubled companies. By doing so, AMCs have taken
control of the board of directors and have been able to engage in corporate
reforms.
C. WORRISOME OUTCOMES OF AMC OPERATION BY 2005

From 1999 to 2000, the four major banks initially transferred
approximately $168.2 billion to Chinese AMCs. 6' This considerable quantity
indicated that the Chinese government, by financing AMCs to purchase NPLs at
book value,66 was taking responsibility for bank losses from policy lending that
predated 1996. Given the potential moral hazard resulting from the banks'
expectation that the government will bail them out again, the State Council, the
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highest Chinese banking authority, has stated that there will be no policy-driven
NPL transfers from the big four banks to AMCs in the future;67 AMCs will have
to survive in the market by themselves.
Therefore, AMCs' future viability will depend on maintaining a balance
between high leverage and capital costs. They must make returns that can cover
operation costs. While AMCs will generate revenues through the recovery of
NPLs by workout or sales on secondary markets, they may also make returns by
selling SOB equities that they hold through debt-for-equity swaps. On the cost
side, AMCs must pay to purchase NPLs and fulfill interest obligations resulting
from People's Bank and parent banks' financing. AMCs' capital costs primarily
arise from their interest obligations, which are linked to the amount of financing
AMCs have been given to buy and swap NPLs. With the high leverage that
Chinese AMCs are using, their combined annual interest obligations are
estimated to exceed $3.63 billion.68
Hence, the AMCs' basic goal is to come up with a like amount of cash
recovery, and the success of this objective depends on the speed of NPL
disposal and the cash recovery rate. Unfortunately, as discussed below, both the
speed of NPL disposition and the cash recovery rate have lagged. In response,
the president of China's central bank surprisingly broke his no-bailout pledge,
announcing in late 2003 that the banking authority had decided to restart the
policy of subsidizing state banks to curb bad loans.69
V. FUTURE CHALLENGES FOR CHINESE AMCs
A. THE LACK OF INSTITUTIONAL TOOLS

China's AMCs lack one major tool-asset securitization--commonly
adopted by other AMCs. International experience demonstrates that a necessary
condition for successful AMC operation is a type of asset that is easy to
restructure and liquidate by securitization, such as real estate loans or secured
loans. Two highly successful examples of AMCs are found in Sweden and the
US. Real estate assets account for 80 percent of the transferred bad assets in
Sweden's AMC and 49 percent of the transferred bad assets in the US RTC.70
However, most of China's NPLs are not secured loans, but consumptive loans
resulting from policy loans for SOEs and banking corruption. Real estate
67
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accounts for only 7 percent of transferred NPLs in Chinese AMCs while
consumptive manufacturing NPLs represent 46 percent of transferred NPLs.7'
Thus, Chinese AMCs have struggled to follow in the tread of earlier, successful
AMCs.
China's lack of legal institutions, such as property laws, also hinders its
securitization efforts. For instance, owners of mortgaged real estate in cities only
possess usage rights in their land, not full ownership, which vests in the state
under the General Principles of the Civil Law of the People's Republic of China
(1987)72 and the Law of the People's Republic of China on Land Administration
(1986)." 3 The complicity behind such property rights allocation adds to the
challenge of securitization.
B. BUREAUCRACY AS AN OBSTACLE

As semi-official departments of their parent banks, AMCs fail to cut
through red tape and cannot operate as efficiently as private financial institutions
should. Foreign investors, such as Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and
Citigroup, which have made enormous returns in Asian NPL disposal markets,
have expressed impatience with the Chinese bureaucracy.74 For instance, by
2004, five years after the initial surge of excitement from foreign investment
banks, only one deal with foreign buyers was closed.75 In September 2004, Lone
Star Funds, a US private equity group, closed its office in Beijing and reduced its
activity in China because of a shortage of deals.76
On October 29, 2004, China's National Development and Reform
Commission ("NDRC") promulgated new rules for approvals and pledged to
issue approvals for purchases by foreign investors within twenty days of
application.77 However, given that the NPL disposal process has been delayed
71
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for the multiple reasons discussed in this section, the NDRC's new rule, which
focuses on removing bureaucratic shackles, can only have a limited effect in
accelerating NPL disposal.
C. Low CASH RECOVERY RATE
The cash recovery rate represents the most important index for evaluating
AMC performance. By 2004, the average cash recovery rate of the four Chinese
AMCs was around 21 percent.8 Although that rate sounds respectable, cash
inflow actually covers less than half of the AMCs' interest burden. 9 By failing to
meet their interest obligations, AMCs face cash-flow pressure and liquidity
problems, which have already materialized.80 The recovery performance of
AMCs is largely related to the type of NPLs they are disposing. The AMC with
the best recovery performance is Cinda AMC, whose NPL portfolio is closely
tied to large-scale infrastructure projects that are easily liquidated. 8' Take away
Cinda, which by 2002 accounted for nearly 40 percent of the total cash recovery
by the four AMCs, and the
cash recovery rate of the remaining three AMCs
82
drops to only 17 percent.
D. FAILURE TO LEAD STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORM
It is important to mention that the four Chinese AMCs also emphasize
restructuring problematic SOEs by engaging in the debt-for-equity swap, thereby
advancing the Chinese government's policy of concurrently pursuing NPL and
SOE reform. To promote this scheme in 1999, government authorities and the
four AMCs jointly selected 580 SOEs, most of which were large and cashstrapped, from the group of debtors.83 AMCs converted the credit of these
problematic SOEs to equity, thereby allowing these SOEs to rapidly write off
debts from their balance sheets. Since then, AMCs have acted as asset-holding
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companies and have participated in the daily operation of these SOEs through
AMC representatives on the SOEs' board of directors. AMCs are required to
help restructure these SOEs and enhance their commercial viability.
The debt-for-equity swap has become one of the most important business
ventures for Chinese AMCs. On average, debt-for-equity swaps involve 30
percent of total transferred NPLs, amounting to $48.97 billion.8 4 AMCs are
supposed to receive dividends for their equity stakes in these SOEs, and these
equity stakes can become another source of cash inflow if the problematic SOEs
yield returns after being restructured.
However, this model has, to date, proven to be a failure. In 2004, banking
authorities ordered four AMCs to sell their equities and exit SOEs as soon as
possible.8" Information asymmetry has hindered AMCs from efficiently
restructuring SOEs. Without capable personnel and professional knowledge
about SOEs' various businesses in mining, textile, and handicraft manufacturing,
AMCs were unable to adequately monitor SOE operations. Furthermore, the
government's scheme forced AMCs to become political reformers, for SOE
restructuring is inherently political. Due to the elaborate guanxi network and
structural corruption within SOEs, any economic reform of SOEs faces strong
political resistance from vested interests. Unfortunately, AMCs are incapable of
making and enforcing such political decisions.
E. GOVERNANCE
Chinese AMCs' complicated management arrangements also hinder the
development of an efficient monitoring mechanism. AMCs are primarily
accountable to the Ministry of Finance, which not only provides them with
initial capital, but also bears the fiscal consequences of their operations.86
However, supervision of AMCs as banking institutions is the responsibility of
other institutions as well. Before February 2004, the central bank, People's Bank
of China, shared the responsibility. After that date, responsibility was transferred
to the Banking Supervision Commission under State Council.8"

84
85

Id at 13-14. The figure cited by Ma and Fung is RMB 405 billion, which has been converted into
dollars using the then-existing exchange rate of $1 per RMB 8.27.
AMC Employee Interview (cited in note 48).

86

At the end of the designated ten-year period, if AMCs retain some NPLs, the Ministry of Finance
must either take over the nominal equity or write off the bad debts. Huang, China's Last Steps at
131 (cited in note 6); Watanabe, ed, Cbina'sNon-PerformingLoanProblem at 43 (cited in note 18).

87

In early 2004, the Banking Supervision Commission was established under State Council to
succeed People's Bank as the major banking supervision institution. It endeavors to allow
People's Bank to focus on macroeconomic matters such as monetary policy and interest rate
regulation. Law of the People's Republic of China on Banking Regulation and Supervision, art 2

Summer 2006

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

However, AMCs still maintain close ties with their parent banks. Consider
the example of Cinda AMC. Most of Cinda's four hundred current employees
are transfers from its parent bank, China Construction Bank ("CCB"). A CCB
deputy governor is the chairman of Cinda and CCB and Cinda AMC share the
same Chinese Communist Party secretary.8 8
This complicated governance structure is likely to lead to moral hazards.
First, the strong links between parent banks and AMCs create an incentive for
parent banks to treat AMCs as an outlet for transferring NPLs, particularly by
exchanging bad assets for good assets (AMC bonds) without serious evaluation
of the quality of the NPLs. Second, since AMCs are backed by the Ministry of
Finance, which will assume responsibility for their fiscal problems after ten
years, AMCs may lack the incentive to maximize benefits from the disposal of
NPLs. They may sell NPLs at an unreasonably low price to improve their shortterm performance in a system that gauges performance mainly by the speed and
quantity of NPL disposal, rather than by the actual returns from NPL disposal.
F. MARKET DISTORTION
Since early 2005, banking authorities have contemplated prolonging the
AMCs' ten-year lifetime, namely because the current outcome of NPL disposal
lags far behind expectations.89 However, given the AMCs' special relationship
with their parent banks and with banking authorities, this extension may give rise
to market distortion in the long run. For precisely this reason, the US RTC seeks
to dispose of bad assets in the shortest time possible.
At least two market distortions may occur if the Chinese government
increases the ten-year life of AMCs. First, to the extent that the government
cannot make a credible commitment that NPL transfer is a once-off policy,
state-owned banks will treat their AMCs as a kind of insurance for their lending
activities. Second, SOEs have taken advantage of debt-for-equity swapping to
relieve themselves of debt burdens. In the worst-case scenario, even profitable
SOEs would stop paying interest on loans in order to qualify for involvement in
the debt-for-equity swap selection list. For example, in the case of Cinda AMC,
the State Economic and Trade Commission, the agency in charge of
recommending SOEs for debt-for-equity swaps, was swamped by requests from
local officials and enterprise directors who wanted their SOEs included on
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Cinda's selection list.9 ° Governmental accession to such requests may generate
more institutional incentives for corruption and exacerbate the moral hazard
problem.9'
VI. CONCLUSION
The fundamental problem with China's banking system stems from the
banks' complicated relationship with SOEs. The close nexus between banks and
SOEs has created large NPLs as well as influenced the dynamics of banking
reform, the rationale of the reform strategy chosen, and the constraints faced by
policymakers.
The success of China's banking reform will largely depend on the success
of its SOE reform. If banks evaluate borrowers' credit purely on a business basis
before successful SOE reform, most SOEs will collapse from a loss of financial
support, immediately triggering political and social crises. Banking reform in
China accordingly began more than a decade after economic reform, and even
then, banking reform initiatives were not autonomous of SOE reform.
The most challenging aspect of China's banking reform is the NPL
problem, which illustrates Chinese banks' irrational lending behaviors, poor
governance structures, rent-seeking inclinations, and overall corruption. In the
early stage of the economic reform movement, the Chinese government had
considered NPLs as a necessary evil. Only since the 1997 Asian financial crisis
have banking authorities squarely confronted the NPL problem that has placed
nearly all domestic banks in a de facto state of bankruptcy. Beginning in 1997,
the problem has increasingly been treated as an issue independent of SOE
reform although the AMC solution is partially designed to curb the SOEs'
problems.
Chinese AMCs are facing identical problems caused by policy burdens and
state-ownership since they are in reality merely another type of state-owned
banking institution. The multiple roles AMCs are supposed to play have
constrained their capacity to defuse the bad loan problem. In addition to being
financial institutions, AMCs have assumed the role of venture capitalists or
incubators in SOE operations through debt-for-equity swaps. Given the
corruption and governance problems within SOEs, AMCs have also been forced
to act as social and political reformers. But AMCs cannot fulfill any of these
roles effectively if they lack the power to choose their clients and to set the price
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for bad loan sales. AMCs' operations are presently not subject to market forces
and their officers do not have a requisite incentive to carry out responsibilities.
The success of AMCs can be assessed along two dimensions. The narrower
success is measured by the speed of bad asset disposition and corporate
restructuring. The broader success is evaluated by whether or not the banking
system experiences repeated financial distress and whether or not credit is
efficiently allocated.
In terms of the speed of bad asset disposition, studies show that although
the speed has been improved to an annual recovery rate of around 21 percent,
the amount of annual returns accounts for less than half of the yearly AMC
interest burden. As for the effect of corporate restructuring, anecdotal evidence
suggests that Chinese banking authorities have required AMCs to retreat from
SOEs due to the AMCs' limited ability to conduct SOE reform.92
In terms of the broader evaluation of the improvement in China's banking
system, although no detailed information has been revealed, a general
assessment indicates that the growth rate of NPLs has actually been accelerating
since the 1997 Asian financial crisis.93 It is important to re-emphasize that those
post-1996 NPLs are not even included in the AMCs' disposal responsibility.94 In
2005, the Standard & Poor's rating agency estimated that China's banks still had
about $650 billion in NPLs, accounting for about 40 percent of outstanding
loans. 9 This proportion is similar to the figure in the pre-AMC period,9 6 which is
not surprising given that a significant fraction of new lending after the
establishment of AMCs is thus far failing to perform. Not only is the underlying
health of the banking system not improving, but the speed at which old NPLs
loans are being disposed is not exceeding that at which new NPLs are being
created.
It clearly appears that AMCs have not fundamentally fixed the faulty
mechanism that has produced NPLs. Recent research even shows that the huge
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amount of bad loans, supposedly intended to make bank loan behavior
conservative, have instead made China's banks expand their lending under the
pressure to decrease their bad loan ratio. Banks can trim this ratio by increasing
the amount of outstanding loans instead of reducing NPLs,97 and they have
readily done so. This tricky behavior shows one distorted effect of banking
reform under the state ownership structure in China.
With its approaching accession to the WTO, China has promised to open
its financial market to foreign banks by December 11, 2006. The Chinese
government has viewed this date as the deadline for banking reform. However,
it seems that China's NPL disposal program has not substantially reduced the
problem. The proposals for a ten-year AMC lifetime, the SOE restructuring plan
via a debt-for-equity swap, and the vow of no bailout for post-1996 NPLs have
all yielded to reality.
What lies ahead for Chinese banking reform? After this Article's analysis of
Chinese AMCs, the answer remains uncertain. On one hand, some scholars are
optimistic" given China's lofty savings rate (the world's highest), its soaring
economic growth, and the strong confidence of its general public in the state
banking system. On the other hand, the Chinese people have not experienced
market or banking failures during these past two decades in the reform era, and
their confidence and expectations may thus not reflect actual risks. Although
Chinese AMCs have helped state-owned banks write off their non-performing
loans in order to list overseas, the bad loans problem has not been
fundamentally resolved; instead, it has been shifted from one state institution to
another. The Chinese government maintains its tight grip on the banking system,
and state-owned AMCs represent one example of this domination. While the
international capital market may, in the short run, be able to intervene in this
turmoil-laden situation through timely injections of cash, such a delicate banking
reform scheme cannot afford any unexpected risk in the long run.
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